I. Introduction
The question of why economists traditionally neglect retailing and the "competition" between retailers and manufacturers is of great interest I to me in my enforcement role at the Federal Trade Commission.! The fundamental insight of Robert Steiner's writings-which argue that such a neglect can result in mistaken applications of the antitrust laws * Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission.
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I For evidence of this neglect see Michael P. Lynch, Why
Economists Are Wrong to Neglect Retailing and How Steiner's Theory Provides an Explanation of Important Regularities in this issue of The Antitrust Builletin. See also William S. Comanor, Steiner's Two-Stage Vision: Implications for Antitrust Analysis, in this isssue of The Antitrust Bulletin at section I (describing how, despite some giving early attention to vertical relationships, "economists and policy-makers had ignored these insights.
.. [and] the competitive significance of vertical relationships was downplayed"). Steiner's insights also continue to resonate with antitrust practitioners who look to actual market realities, rather than mere formalistic distinctions.3 The serious dearth of economic scholarship and ";; literature devoted to distribution issues is a problematic state of ,J-, affairs, especially at a time when the input of economists is a critical 1:' factor shaping judicial and enforcement decisions in the antitrust ft!: fiel~iS article will summarize some of the main contributions of Steiner's work, noting its relation to recent economic research concerning the retail sector and the appropriate standards for evaluating the competitive effects of horizontal retail mergers. The article will i then discuss some shortcomings of these new economic studies, most ; ?otably. the failur~ to addn;ss implic~tions .of ~istri??tion ch~nel i",~i rnteractlon for vertIcal restramts analysIs. Sterner s wntlngs provIde a ;;:i;(:i:ũ nique p~rspectiv.e ~n the ~enefits and harms vertical restraints ~y ~,,~~'itl generate rn certarn rndustnes; however, at present, the challengrng }":,.:i~~tr1i~ questions posed by Steiner are in need of answers. Antitrust :;~it:~! economists should rise to the challenge and seek these answers, lest "",~:~,~:" the profession risk pursuing an antitrust enforcement policy that, by ':'\~:;::ii default, leaves no role for procompetitive vertical enforcement. ~,,;J.,% For decades, Steiner has argued that economists who model consumer goods markets frequently neglect basic facts about distribution-a neglect that can lead to erroneous conclusions.4
Most economic models of consumer goods markets completely ignore retail activities, based upon an assumption that retail markets are perfectly competitive. According to this view, distribution is characterized as an undifferentiated pass-through for manufacturing costs, competitive conditions, and the like. For example, an antitrust economist might assume that a change in the cost of manufacturing a consumer good would be fully reflected in the retail price paid by end-use consumers. Steiner calls this prevailing view the "single-stage" model.5
But Steiner observes that, in reality, distributors and retailers face imperfect competition from their counterparts, and therefore often are able to exercise a degree of market power.6 He also asserts that manufacturers and retailers engage in "vertical competition," by competing to perform functions such as product certification or the provision of product information.7 Steiner posits that fIrms at successive stages of an industry should be defmed as vertical competitors "when they can take sales, margins or market shares from each other."8 4 See, e.g., Robert L. Steiner, Marketing Productivity in Consumer Good Industries-A Vertical Perspective, 42 J. MARKET. 60, 61-62 (1978) (describing Steiner's early formulation of the "single-stage error").
5 E.g., id. For a more recent formulation see Robert L. Steiner, A DuolStage View of the Consumer Goods Economy, 35 J. EcON. ISSUES 27 (2001) .
6 See, e.g., Steiner, Vertical Restraints, supra note 2, at 157-58.
7 See Comanor, supra note I, at section II (noting, after examining Steiner's contributions to antitrust scholarship, that "[t]he essential point here is that providing product information is a critical economic function that provides a substantial return. ..and [that therefore] higher margins accrue to those providing the information.").
8 Steiner, lntrabrand Competition, supra note 2, at 161; Steiner, Vertical Restraints, supra note 2, at 158-60; Steiner, Third Relevant Market, supra note 2, at 721-25. See also id. at 724 (describing vertical competition as "the contest between a manufacturer and his retailers to obtain a larger share of a brand's retail price").
Steiner therefore seeks to replace the prevailing single-stage model with a "dual-stage" model that accounts for competitive vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in consumer goods markets.9
Steiner's views on retailing and the vertical relationships within retail markets have potentially important implications for antitrust law.
III. Implications for merger policy
With respect to merger analysis, Steiner believes the federal Horizontal Merger Guidelineslo are based largely on a single-stage approach that does not accurately reflect the workings of retail markets. According to Steiner, this single-stage approach results in a number of inadequacies when the Guidelines are applied to mergers in retail markets-in areas ranging from geographic market definition, merger-specific efficiencies and buyer power, to the use of retail prices (e.g., scanner data) for estimating manufacturing-level effects.11 At each step, Steiner suggests, antitrust analysis of a merger in a consumer goods industry must take into account the role of the "third relevant market"-that is, "the downstream market(s) in which distribution firms resell the goods of manufacturers in the relevant ;: product market to household consumers in the relevant geographic market."12
In recent years, economists [mally have begun to address some of the challenges raised by Steiner's insights about the nature of retail competition and its implications for merger policy. In fact, FTC economists and others have started exploring the causes of retail price variation, acknowledging that such variation raises questions for eco-9 E.g., Steiner, supra note 5. Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997) Economics, January 2000) (using empirical evidence from an extensive nonpublic data set to document a number of empirical regularities in retail price behavior that are at odds with traditional economic conventions, including, inter alia, that products appear to go on sale more often when consumer demand is high (e.g., eggs before Easter) and that certain brands and sizes are far more likely to go on sale than others). For additional studies see the "Working Papers" page of the FTC Bureau of Economics Web site, available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econwork.htrn. 14 E.g., Steven Tenn & John M. Yunn, Retail Distribution Is Ignored:
Should It Be? (Working Paper 18, 2004 ) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (noting the "obvious policy implications" of the finding that "on average, quantities are estimated to react more strongly to price than they actually do" for market delineation and competitive effects). See also DANIEL HoSKEN ET AL., DEMAND SYSTEM EsTIMAnoN AND ITS APpucAnoN TO HORIZON-TAL MERGER ANALYSIS (Working Paper 246, FTC Bureau of Economics, April 2002) (noting, inter alia, the difficulties involved in translating elasticities estimated with retail-level data into wholesale level elasticities). 11111_lr 990 : The antitrust bulletin sumer behavior. Steiner further suggests that an upstream merger sometimes "might be the spark that would facilitate a vertical deal that enabled margins to rise," at both the upstream and retail levels, to the detriment of consumers. 15
At the same time, however, Steiner himself acknowledges that the interaction between manufacturers and retailers may, in fact, prevent the occurrence of anticompetitive effects at the consumer level when market power increases at the manufacturing level.l6 For instance, Steiner believes that the introduction of large-scale brand advertising into a category where no such advertising previously has existed can lead to an increase in the market power of manufacturers at the expense of their retailers, without any significant effect on consumers. 17 The possibility that an increase in upstream market power may not always fully translate to a comparable downstream effect is also supported by a recent economic model showing that, given a monopolistic retail sector, an upstream merger may decrease, leave unchanged, or even increase downstream consumer welfare.18 It is also possible that the bias in current empirical estimates can sometimes lead to an underestimation of retail price elasticity, although-as noted above-the bias more commonly has the opposite effect of a retail price elasticity overestimation.19
Perhaps horizontal merger analysis would be more robust and realĩ stic (albeit more uncertain at times) were it more fully to account for the unique aspects of retail markets; thus, it is encouraging to see more economists paying attention to these issues. Steiner's work and IS Steiner, Third Relevant Market, supra note 2, at 744 (referencing his own analysis of the Toys-"R"-Us case as an example of the ability of a "power retailer" to diminish retail competition by inducing manufacturers to adopt vertical restraints).
16 See Comanor, supra note 1, at section III.B. (discussing the implications of Steiner's insights for merger enforcement policy).
17 See, e.g., Steiner, Third Relevant Market, supra note 2, at 743-44. IV. Implications for the analysis of vertical restraints
As to vertical restraints, even more so than in the merger context, Steiner's views diverge from the dominant economic approach. Notably, Steiner repeatedly has insisted that certain vertical restraints, especially nonprice distribution restraints, frequently generate an anticompetitive effect when employed by manufacturers of powerful brands}! Here, Steiner's views are in sharp contrast with the Chicago school's benign view of vertical restraints}2
In his earlier work, Steiner argued that while vertical restraints sometimes may be efficient, they can impede the introduction of more efficient, lower-cost forms of retailing, to the detriment of con- "scenarios that involve a firm or firms at one level of activity using vertical restraints deliberately to confer market power on firms at an adjacent level are inherently suspect"). See also Steiner, Third Relevant Market, supra note 2, at 722 (recognizing his fundamental divergence from the accepted economic wisdom and noting that "[t]he complementary nature of firms at"'\ successive stages is a given in law and economics. The competitive dimension of the relationship is not generally recognized and is often flat out denied. .."). Steiner's inverse association, however, is not universal.30 Moreover, even where it is observed, skeptical economists might offer different interpretations. They might argue, for example, that manufacturers who engage in national advertising are expected to increase their own margins, at the expense of retailers who previously assumed all promotional costs. An "inverse" relationship between manufacturer and retailer margins would simply reflect a shifting of costs from one level to another, rather than "vertical competition" as described by Steiner. Such counter-explanations for inverse relationships between the margins of manufacturers and retailers do not necessarily disprove the existence of vertical competition. They do, however, highlight the need for further scholarship and analysis before reaching any conclusions.
Moreover, Steiner himself has recognized that the legal implications of his insights require further development. For example, he has argued that a rule of reason approach to distribution restraints is too permissive while per se treatment of price restraints may be too harsh. Steiner therefore advocated a common test for all vertical restraints: where a plaintiff has established that the manufacturer has "significant" horizontal and vertical market power, the burden should shift to the manufacturer to show that any vertical restrictions are not anticompetitive.31 But even while calling for a universal standard for evaluating all vertical restraints, Steiner admitted that even he would not know how to frame a clear rule that would apply to both price and nonprice restraints.32 29 E.g., Steiner, supra note 28; Steiner, Third Relevant Market, supra note 2. Steiner's work also implies a second inverse relationship between the margins of the leading national brand manufacturers and their fringe competitors. See Lynch, supra note 1, at sections III. ..can be characterized as stressing market outcomes that could possibly occur, rather than outcomes that are likely to occur") (emphasis added). Thus, in the words of a leading antitrust scholar:
The biggest danger presented by post-Chicago antitrust economics is ...that antitrust tribunals will be confronted with antitrust solutions that they are not capable of administering.
Indeed, the major shortcoming of post-Chicago antitrust analysis is its failure to take seriously problems of judicial or agency administration. It is possible that Steiner's insights could provide an additional basis for sensible vertical enforcement in appropriate cases. After all, few Chicago school advocates would say that vertical restraints are never harmful. But the future of vertical restraints law will remain highly uncertain unless and until antitrust scholars make an afflfmative effort to intensify and refme their empirical study of vertical effects.39
The uncertain future of the vertical restraints doctrine should be of particular concern to antitrust enforcers. The effect of an extreme concern on errors of overenforcement in the vertical area has been virtually to eliminate purely vertical antitrust enforcement at the federal level. Although the law in the books still appears critical of some vertical restraints,40 business decisionmakers are aware that the risk of a Enforcement of the rule against naked horizontal restraints appears to be beneficial. But suits against mergers more often than not have attacked combinations that increased efficiency. ...There are good theoretical reasons to believe that the costs of other enforcement efforts have exceeded the benefits.
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1,2-3 (1984) (footnotes omitted and emphases added) (further referencing various basic texts of the Chicago approach for this proposition). Cf. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872,882 (2004) (stating, in a case involving allegations of vertical exclusionary practices by a monopolist, that the cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of section 2 liability and that "[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect"') (citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) ).
39 A related requirement is that antitrust economists develop formal, testable models that incorporate such findings in a tractable way. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 1, sections III.C.-III.D. (discussing this problem in the specific context of Steiner's ideas, from the point of view of a sympathetic economist).
40 See, e.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 735-36 (1988) (noting that "a vertical restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price levels") (emphasis in original); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911) (formulating the per se rule against resale price maintenance). See also POSNER, supra note 22, at 189 (sadly conceding that the Court has not overruled Dr. Miles and that, therefore, " [t] he per se rule against resale price maintenance remains").
federal enforcement action in the vertical area is very low, and therefore may be more likely to use vertical restraints to achieve antic ompetitive ends. Current antitrust doctrine greatly needs to build on the , foundation laid by Steiner and other scholars. New economic learning in this area should provide us with further guidance on when specific vertical restraints are sufficiently harmful to warrant a more proactive, if still careful, enforcement approach.I
